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Beyond Measuring the Voice of the People:
The Evolving Role of Political Polling in Indonesia’s
Local Leader Elections
Agus Trihartono*
Since 2005, political polling and the application of polls-based candidacy have been 
enormously influential and, in fact, have become vital for local leader elections
(Pilkada), particularly in Indonesia’s districts and municipalities.  The Golkar Party’s
declaration that it was moving to polls-based candidacy created a domino effect,
inducing other major political parties—such as the National Mandate Party (Partai
Amanat Nasional, PAN), the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), and the Indo-
nesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan,
PDIP)—to follow Golkar’s approach to contesting local constituencies.  As polling
becomes a new device for reforming the political recruitment process, political poll-
ing exercises have also unintendedly transformed into a means for waging a power
struggle.  Political actors have exploited polling as a tool for gaining a political
vehicle, as a map for soliciting bribes, as a map for guiding the mobilization of votes, 
and as a means for inviting an indirect bandwagon effect.  In short, political polling
has moved beyond acting as a tracker of voters’ preferences to become a popular
political device.
Keywords: political polling, local leader elections, democratization, Indonesia
Introduction
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia embarked on an intensive project of local
democratization.  Under the banner of applying Law Number 32 of 2004 regarding
“Regional Government,” local leaders—such as governors, district leaders (bupati), and 
mayors—were to be directly elected by the people for the first time in Indonesian polit-
ical history.  In particular, from June 2005 onward, Indonesia began experiencing two
enormous waves of direct local leader elections (Pemilu Kepala Daerah, Pemilukada or
Pilkada; hereafter Pilkada).  The first episode was from mid-2005 to the beginning of 
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2009, and the second is still ongoing, beginning in late 2009 and extending to the begin-
ning of 2014.  From 2005 to 2008, Indonesia held no fewer than 500 Pilkada spanning all
regions (Centre for Electoral Reform 2008).  According to the Badan Pengawas Pemilu
or Bawaslu (Election Monitoring Body), there were also approximately 244 Pilkada
 during the year 2010 (Indonesia, Badan Pengawas Pemilu [Bawaslu] 2011) and 116
Pilkada in 2011.  In addition, from 2005 to 2010 more than 2,200 pairs of candidates ran 
for gubernatorial, bupati, and mayoral offices; there were also 333 pairs running for such
offices in 2011 alone (ibid.).  The implementation of Pilkada has resulted in the develop-
ment of a remarkably vigorous local democracy, as indicated by the massive number of 
candidates and the frequency of elections.  Judging from the large number of elections
and candidates involved, Indonesia is unquestionably the country of elections.
One of the most important phenomena marking Pilkada has been the involvement 
of polling and other pollsters’ activities in these contests.  The discussion of electoral
politics in Indonesia has suddenly been filled with insider accounts of the results of poll-
ing activities,1) as polling has not only become a ubiquitous new fashion in local politics 
but has also noticeably colored the dynamics of local leader elections.  It seems likely
that political polling has become an integral part of almost every local leader election in
Indonesia.
Previous seminal works addressing the topic of political polling in Indonesia have
placed more emphasis on the mushrooming of polling at the national level (Mietzner 
2009), the increasing role of pollsters as professionals (Mohammad Qodari 2010) or so-
called polls-based political consultants,2) and the growing employment of political market-
1) In academic discussions, the terms “polling” (polls) and “survey” are interchangeable and similar. 
The distinction between polls and surveys is not about the methodology, but merely the number of 
issues in the excavation process of public opinion.  Polling usually deals with a single issue, while 
surveys deal with multiple issues (Norrander and Wilcox 1997).
2) In Indonesia, pollsters and polls-based political consultants are two similar entities with different 
duties.  Most polls-based political consultants are polling agencies or pollsters.  Yet not all pollsters 
are polls-based political consultants.  Polling is the primary tool used by both pollsters and polls-
based political consultants in their work.  However, pollsters only conduct and publish the results 
of polls or surveys.  Political consultants go farther by utilizing the results of polls or surveys to 
help their clients in the election.  Obvious examples of pollsters are the polling agency Indonesian 
Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI) and the Jakarta-based Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, Education, and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan 
Ekonomi dan Sosial, LP3ES), which only carry out polls or surveys.  In contrast, political consultants 
mainly, but not exclusively, carry out three major tasks: (1) vote mapping through conducting polls 
and surveys, focus group discussions, interviews with elites, and content analyses of local media; 
(2) vote influencing through ad design and production, campaign attribute design and production, 
and voter mobilization (door-to-door campaigns) as well as push polling; (3) vote maintenance 
through campaigner training, election witness training, and doing quick counts.  Besides national 
political consultants, according to Irman Yasin Limpo (2010, 22–24), there are also many local 
political consultants.
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ing that is the result of the presence of pollsters in the political arena (Ufen 2010).  Those
studies emphasize the impact of the presence of pollsters in the two national elections
in 2004 and 2009.  Although the involvement of polling and pollsters at the politically
vibrant national level is headline-grabbing, previous works neglect the utilization of poll-
ing by political parties in attempting to identify electable candidates, as well as the fact
that polling is used as a political weapon rather than a barometer of public sentiment.
Admittedly, the utilization and exploitation of polling in political history is not the
newest phenomenon.  In his classic seminal work more than 50 years ago, Louis Harris
(1963), one of the key founders of polling, assertively foresaw that polls were “an impor-
tant part of the arsenal of weapons used in modern American political campaigns.”  R. A.
Camp (1996) enthusiastically describes polling as a device that political leaders take
advantage of for their own political interest, specifically to indicate successful platforms
and increase their ability to defeat their opponents as well as to improve their political
image.  In a similar vein, Dennis Johnson (2001; 2009) and Christopher Wlezien and
Robert Erikson (2003) view polling as being exploited by politicians to enhance their
image during the campaign period.  In short, it is not uncommon to take advantage of 
polling in political games.
However, in the context of Indonesia, one of the largest democratic countries in the
world, a study discussing the development of public opinion polling and how it has been
used (and exploited) seems exceptionally limited.  While the importance of political poll-
ing in the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia has increased, the country has been
neglected in discussions on the development of polling in both developed and developing
democracies (Geer 2004; Carballo and Hjelmar 2008; Johnson 2009).  Above all, in the 
context of Indonesia’s local politics, it seems no research so far has focused on issues
such as the development, utilization, and exploitation of public opinion polling.  Against
this background, this study attempts to fill in the gap by demonstrating the extent of 
utilization and exploitation of polls in Indonesian politics, specifically in the era of Pilkada
starting from 2005.
This paper suggests that political polling in local Indonesian politics has moved 
beyond its long-established use as an instrument to capture the so-called voice of the
people.  Even though from the beginning the development of polling in Indonesia was
designed to consolidate democracy and to promote the previously neglected grassroots
voice, this paper provides evidence that there has been an unintended transformation in
the way polling is utilized.  Local political players have exploited polling as a political 
instrument in their struggle for power.  Polling is the most recent method by which
political parties improve their political recruitment process at the local level.  Polling also 
aids in campaign strategy, key decision making, developing winning strategies, and build-
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ing up campaign communications.  This study attempts to show that the use of polling is
increasing, and that polling is gradually gaining acceptance as a sophisticated tool to obtain 
a political vehicle, a bribery map, and a voter mobilization map, and as a means for invit-
ing an indirect bandwagon effect.  While providing some cases from Pilkada in districts 
and municipalities of North Sumatra, East Java, and South Sulawesi in 2009 through 2011 
will not permit generalization, this analysis sheds new light on the other side of political
polling in the current dynamics of local Indonesian politics.
To explore the aforesaid argument, the paper is divided into three sections.  The
first briefly discusses local leader elections, political parties, and the significance of polit-
ical polling in the age of Pilkada.  The second section answers the question of why 
pollsters have participated in the fiesta of Indonesian local leader elections since 2005.
The third elaborates on the use of political polling in Pilkada, specifically spotlighting
how polling has become both a new candidacy mechanism and a new political weapon.
Throughout this study, I attempt to demonstrate that the emerging role of political poll-
ing in the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian local politics has gone far beyond merely
uncovering people’s preferences.
Pilkada, Political Parties, and Voters
The implementation of Pilkada was promoted as a means of deepening democratization
and helping to consolidate democratic practices at the local level. Pilkada has provided
local communities with important opportunities, as the emergence of grassroots national 
leaders has been followed by the appearance of local leaders who possess popular support 
(Leigh 2005).  Furthermore, Pilkada has provided a space for the wider participation of 
society in the democratic process and a correction to the previous indirect system in that 
it supplies regional leaders of greater quality and accountability (Djohermansyah Djohan
2004).  Finally, Pilkada also offers opportunities for the grassroots to actualize their politi-
cal rights without worrying that they will be reduced by the interests of political elites.
There are several essential aspects of Pilkada that need to be highlighted.  First, 
although the position of political parties is essential in Pilkada, there is an argument that 
Pilkada has made political parties weak in some ways (Choi 2009).  Political parties are 
the most prominent and vital institutions in the current practice of local democracy, as 
their basic role is to recruit and provide cadres to participate in elections and to nominate 
candidates for administration in a “gate keeping position” (Schiller 2009, 152).  In the
political recruitment process, political parties make the initial selection of candidates and 
provide alternatives for voters in elections.  Understandably, political parties are vital in
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the nomination process because candidates can be nominated only by them.
Second, since 2007, democracy at the local level has been revived following a key 
review by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi).  This review was a legal 
consequence following the Constitutional Court ruling on July 23, 2007 that non-party
candidates would be allowed to run in local elections subsequent to the post-conflict 2006 
vote in Aceh Province that permitted local actors to run as independents.  According to
the review of Law Number 32 Year 2004, July 23, 2007, the court passed a petition regard-
ing the process of non-party side nominations,3) known as the independent pathway (jalur 
independen).  The review opened up the opportunity for candidates to run in elections 
without political party nomination.4)  Considering that new development, therefore, at 
present Indonesia has two important and legitimate mediums through which political
actors run for local elections, namely, the political party and the independent pathway.
Third, direct (local leader) elections have positioned voters as the premier judge in
determining leaders.  Voters have autonomy in electing a pair of local leaders inde-
pendently.  As we will discuss later, voters can even vote differently from their previous
choice of party representatives in national and local legislatures.  Consequently, respond-
ing to the “autonomy” of voters in electing candidates, the terms “popular,” “acceptable,” 
and “electable” are part of the vocabulary for candidates who struggle in contemporary
local elections.
Finally, local elections are an indispensable arena for political parties to seize power. 
Following the implementation of decentralization at the local level, the authority given
by the central government to local governments in managing financial and political 
resources has significantly increased.  At the same time, lodging control of local govern-
ment with local elites means the distance between those elites and their constituents
has narrowed.  Therefore, winning local elections is not understood simply as procuring
control of local government but is also the means by which to be directly in touch with 
the acquisition and maintenance of political constituencies at the grassroots.  In this 
3) Simply put, because of that review, the candidacy process can also be carried out individually.  More 
specifically, the changes in Law Number 32 Year 2004, namely, Law Number 12 Year 2008, article 
2, state that prospective local candidates can also be nominated by individuals with support from a 
set number of people.  Independent candidates can run for election if a pair has support from 3 
percent to 6.5 percent of the population in the region, depending on its size.  That support, verified 
by copies of the supporters’ identity cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, KTP), must come from more 
than half of the sub-units of the particular region.
4) In practice, even though nominating through independent pathways is open and available for can-
didates, it cannot be said that independent pathways are easier than going through political parties 
because the process of collecting so many citizen ID cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, KTP) is not 
only intricate but also expensive.  Interview with Yos Rizal Anwar, former bupati candidate of Lima 
Puluh Kota District, Jakarta, June 7, 2009.
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sense, success in local elections is also about the survival and sustainability of political 
parties at the grassroots.
Accordingly, political parties have a strong rationale for extensive involvement in 
local elections.  First, parties now recognize victory in local elections as an opportunity
for their cadres to engage in the political learning process.  For more than 32 years dur-
ing the Suharto era, political parties were marginalized and impotent.  According to Akbar 
Tanjung, a senior politician of the Golkar Party, during the Suharto era parties served as
“cheerleaders” and as participants in political displays, as they did not have an arena in
which to perform their traditional roles and functions regarding political recruitment and
institutionalization.5)  Second, political parties now consider success in local elections as
an entry point for exercising executive power in each region.  This realization is particu-
larly important because executive positions are seen as part of a vital machine for the
implementation of policies and political visions, as well as for providing access to financial
and political resources.  Finally, for young and minor political parties, which still have
limited potential cadres to promote in the contestations, local leader elections are an
arena for attracting potential and popular candidates from non internal party’s cadres to
run under their flag.
In addition, the dynamics of local leader elections require political actors to under-
stand changes in voting behavior.  While we cannot generalize that all things are equal
in all Pilkada, as in some cases voting behavior has special characteristics—particularly
in areas of conflict such as Aceh, Poso, and Papua—significant changes in voting be-
havior are evident in local leader elections.  Departing from a class perspective, some
scholars, for instance, started to question the weight of the political sects (politik aliran)
approach (Hadiz 2004a; 2004b).  Utilizing regression analysis, the works of politik aliran, 
religious affinity, regions, ethnicity, and social class of voting behavior in the post-Suharto 
democracy have been also questioned (Saiful Mujani and Liddle 2004; 2009; Saiful Mujani 
et al. 2012).  Furthermore, political behavior is obviously different now compared with 
the 1950s (Saiful Mujani 2004).  Regarding the significant changes, thus, the strategy
for facing current Pilkada cannot be based merely on conventional ideas regarding the
importance of political sects, political machines, and political patrimonialism.
Contemporary Pilkada are not only important for local people to have the opportu-
nity to directly select their leaders; Pilkada necessitate political adjustments in local 
actors’ strategies to account for the large shift in local political dynamics.  The new 
political dynamic has also provided an entry point for pollsters and political polling to play 
5) Interview with Akbar Tanjung, chairman of the Trustees Board of the Golkar Party, Jakarta, June 
15, 2010.
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a role in an evolving set of political games, as pollsters are seen as one of the most 
capable actors in detecting and measuring new trends in voting behavior.
Therefore, there is a symbiotic mutualism between local players and pollsters that
represents the new dynamics in local leader elections.  According to Heri Akhmadi6) and 
Akhmad Mubarok,7) senior politicians in the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) and the Democratic Party (Partai 
Demokrat, PD), political parties and pollsters are pillars that support each other as 
 couples, striving to fulfill each other’s needs.  Moreover, with the new circumstances in
local contests, pollsters have been the most reliable means to detect fundamental changes 
in voting behavior.  In short, pollsters fill the hole left by this new reality and play a
notably significant role in local contests.
Polling in Local Elections
As previously mentioned, the increased involvement of political polling in local leader
elections coincided with the first cycle of Pilkada that began in 2005.  Before 2005, there
were few pollsters in Indonesia.  For instance, in the 1999 general elections there were
five pollsters conducting polls at the national level: the Resource Productivity Center;
the International Foundation for Election Systems; the Jakarta-based Institute for Social
and Economic Research, Education, and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan 
dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, LP3ES); the Kompas newspaper; and the Political 
Laboratory of the University of Indonesia (Komite Pemberdayaan Politik-Lab Politik UI) 
(Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2004, 30–31).  In addition, before the 2004 general elections 
there were some pollsters involved in national pre-election polling, such as the Center
for Islamic Studies and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat), the Indonesian 
Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI), Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate (SSS), and
Danareksa Research Institute.  There were also media polls, such as the R&D of Kompas
Daily (Litbang Kompas), polls by SMS (short message system) of the SCTV (Surya Citra
Televisi), and tele-polling of MARS Indonesia (ibid., 47–54).  Although the number of 
pollsters and their activities were obvious, as Kuskridho Ambardi, executive director of 
the Jakarta-based LSI, illustrated, polls in this period were not part of widely accepted
political, social, and economic discussions as many party men were still unaware and
6) Interview with Heri Akhmadi, senior politician of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 
Jakarta, May 31, 2010.
7) Interview with Akhmad Mubarok, chairman of the National Assembly of Party Leaders of the Dem-
ocratic Party, Jakarta, June 14, 2010.
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rejected the idea that polls should be included in a shared democratic vocabulary.  At the
time, political actors and mass media exposed doubts regarding the value and political
influence of polls.8)
Following the first wave of local leader elections starting in 2005, the number of 
pollsters mushroomed, including those participating in Pilkada, such as media pollsters
(Republika, Bisnis Indonesia, etc.), political party pollsters (i.e. the PDIP’s Rekode), and
national and local pollsters.9)  Moreover, media coverage of polling was massive, and the
publication of polling results was also intensive, which led to a “survey fever” in Indone-
sian politics nationally and locally.
The earliest involvement of polling activities in local politics was in the first local
leader elections in Kutai Kartanegara, held on June 1, 2005.  The duo of Syaukani Hasan
Rais and Samsuri Aspar took the assistance of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.10)  Further, the election for the governor of Banten Province in
November 2006 marked the beginning of the “war” among national pollsters in Pilkada, 
as many national pollsters became involved in the contest.11)  The vigorous participation 
of pollsters in Pilkada has come to the fore ever since the Golkar Party officially invited
pollsters to become a central instrument in its polls-based candidacy, which began in
December 2005, under the banner of the party’s Operational Guidelines (Juklak, Petunjuk 
Pelaksanaan) Number 2 Year 2005.12)  From those moments, polling has been omni-
present in Pilkada.
The application of polling in direct local leader elections has raised the expectation 
that polling itself strengthens and supports the development of local democracy.  In other 
words, political polling is thought to encourage political actors to hear the previously 
neglected voices of local communities, and to create visions and frameworks that reflect 
people’s opinions.  The utilization of polling, therefore, has created great optimism that 
8) Interview with Kuskridho Ambardi, Jakarta, June 11, 2010.
9) Some examples are the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, PT. LSI), National 
Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Nasional, LSN), Survey and Research Institute of Nusantara 
(Lembaga Survei dan Kajian Nusantara, Laksnu), Indonesian Research Development Institute 
(IRDI), Center for Policy Studies and Strategic Development (Pusat Kajian Kebijakan dan Pemban-
gunan Strategis, Puskaptis), Indonesian Social Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Sosial Indonesia), 
Indo-Barometer, Indonesian Institute for Survey and Public Management (Lembaga Survey dan 
Manajemen Publik Indonesia), Indonesian Public Policy Information Center (Sentra Informasi 
 Kebijakan Publik Indonesia), and Centre for the Study of Development and Democracy (CESDA).
10) Interview with Sunny Tanuwidjaya, researcher at the CSIS, Jakarta, February 28, 2009.
11) Interview with Saiful Mujani, senior expert on public opinion polling in Indonesia, and owner (among 
others) of Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, Jakarta, December 19, 2011.
12) Interview with Rulli Azwar, the former vice secretary general of the Golkar Party’s Winning Elec-
tion Body (Badan Pemenangan Pemilu, Bappilu), Jakarta, June 3, 2010.
Beyond Measuring the Voice of the People 159
the government and political actors will be encouraged to be more responsive to popular
perspectives.  In particular, it is thought that polling promotes the emergence of local
leaders in closer touch with community preferences.13)  Consequently, it is believed that
those policies and platforms that are contrary to popular aspirations will be abandoned.
In practice, political parties and candidates utilize polling to improve their adaptation 
to a new local political environment by engaging in such activities as the following: (1) 
mapping the most favorable program to attract voters’ support; (2) evaluating the perfor-
mance of the incumbent; (3) measuring the degree of popularity, acceptability, and elect-
ability of both political parties and potential candidates; (4) identifying party identification 
among voters and swing voters; (5) observing which media are most appropriate for
socialization; (6) determining how candidates should socialize with voters; (7) scrutiniz-
ing the whom, the where, and the why of potential supporters and rivals; and finally (8)
testing the waters and mapping strategies for minimizing possible losses.14)  Last but not
least, political parties and candidates view polling outcomes as the ultimate factor in 
deciding whether or not to continue running for election.  By doing so, political actors
can minimize their losses and failures.
With regard to Pilkada, there are four types of pollsters that have played a role in 
local contests.  The first are national pollsters.  Almost all national pollsters are key play-
ers in local leader elections.  Prominent names, such as the LSI, the Indonesian Survey 
Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia), Indo-Barometer, Cirrus Surveyor Indonesia, 
National Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Nasional), and Indonesian Vote Network
(Jaringan Suara Indonesia), have increased the vibrancy of local elections.  The second
type of pollsters are local pollsters that are part of national organizations.  These institu-
tions have an organizational relationship with the “parent” pollsters in their headquarters. 
Examples are the 34 local partner institutions of the Indonesian Survey Circle, which are 
also incorporated in the Indonesian Association for Public Opinion Research (Asosiasi
Riset Opini Publik Indonesia, AROPI).15)  The third type are local pollsters who initially
operated as individuals working with national pollsters but later, having gained the skills
and knowledge required for public opinion polling and political consultancy, decided to
13) Interview with Saiful Mujani, Jakarta, December 19, 2011.
14) Interview with Burhanuddin Muhtadi, senior researcher of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), 
Jakarta, August 25, 2010; and interview with Iman Yasin Limpo, the owner of the Makassar-based 
local political consultant Adhyaksa Supporting House, Makassar, February 21, 2012.
15) Pollsters in Indonesia mostly belong to one of two associations: the Indonesian Association for 
Public Opinion Research (AROPI) and the Indonesian Association of Public Opinion Survey 
(PERSEPI).  Members of those two associations include more than 60 pollsters.  However, there 
are also pollsters, mostly local pollsters, that are not association members, i.e., they are not regis-
tered with either association.
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become independent and set up their own local polling organizations.  Examples are the
Makassar-based Adhyaksa Supporting House and the Makassar-based Celebes Research
and Consulting.  Adhyaksa Supporting House worked together with the Indonesian 
 Survey Circle to assist the pair consisting of Syahrul Yasin Limpo and Agus Arifin
Nu’mang in the 2007 South Sulawesi gubernatorial elections.16)  Meanwhile, the head of 
Celebes Research and Consulting previously worked at the LSI.  The last type of pollsters
are “independent” local pollsters.  These pollsters have from the beginning worked on
their own: acquiring the necessary skills, understanding polling methods, and conducting 
surveys.  They have developed and expanded a specific market segment.  These pollsters 
have no relations with pollsters at either the organization or the network level.  Examples 
include the Surabaya-based Research Center for Democracy and Human Rights (Pusat
Studi Demokrasi dan Hak Azasi Manusia, Pusdeham); the Makassar-based Insert Insti-
tute, Yayasan Masagena, and Script Survey Indonesia; and the Medan-based Inter-Media
Study.
Local Leader Elections: Pollsters’ New Realm
In general, pollsters have realized that local leader elections are attractive because they
provide opportunities to bet on the new arena of political contests.  Because local leader
elections are numerous and spread out in various areas, the elections have provided new
ground on which pollsters can survive, obtain significant financial benefits, and even attain 
a sphere of influence.
In comparison, national elections (both general and presidential), though note-
worthy, attention-grabbing, and having significant financial impact, attract only the biggest 
and fittest pollsters.  Therefore, there have been only a few outstanding pollsters who
have become involved in and taken advantage of these two principal national events. 
National elections require more than just skills and wills; they require such technical
factors as a significant survey network that permeates the country, a high degree of 
professionalism, and the capacity to cover the high cost of a national survey.  These are 
among the factors behind the low participation rate of pollsters in national contests.  In 
addition, the national election is a ruthless judge of pollsters’ credibility because the 
results, particularly pre-election polling and quick counts, are directly tested by the 
public, openly examined by the mass media, and critically discussed in academic circles.
Simply put, polling outcomes are scrutinized and compared to the official vote count of 
the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU).  Consequently, the publica-
tion of polling results means laying a bet not only on the credibility but also on the sus-
16) Interview with Iman Yasin Limpo, February 21, 2011.
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tainability of a pollster’s activity.  The ability to accurately predict the outcome of an 
election is one of the pollster’s pillars of credibility.  Although polling is not an instrument 
for predicting election results, if polling results are significantly different from the actual
results of the election it spells disaster for the pollster’s credibility.  A pollster named
Information Research Institute (Lembaga Riset Informasi, LRI), also known as Johan 
Polls, was closed down after it failed to predict the outcome of the 2009 presidential 
election.  The LRI released the results of surveys conducted in the 15 most populous
provinces, involving 4,000 to 12,000 respondents per province.  Based on the polling,
LRI confidently predicted that the 2009 presidential election would go to the second
round.  In fact, in the presidential election held on July 8, 2009 the SBY-Budiono pair had
a landslide victory in the first round (60 percent).  This failure to predict an accurate result
led the owner of the LRI to close the office for good.17)  This tale will not soon be forgot-
ten in the Indonesian pollster community’s collective history.  Thus, in national elections, 
it seems that accuracy is the ultimate test that accounts for the rise and fall of pollsters.
Unlike the case of national pollsters, for local pollsters Pilkada represent the future 
of their existence.  Local leader elections seem to provide opportunities for all kinds of 
pollsters: prominent national pollsters, national pollsters who do not participate in 
national elections, and even local pollsters with limited capacity all come to enjoy the
“feast of local democracy.”  In addition, local leader elections absorb many kinds of poll-
sters who wield, methodologically speaking, good, bad, and ugly techniques.  Even the
image and credibility of a pollster seems not to be critical in the context of local leader
elections.  A pollster that does not always succeed in local polling is still able to advertise
in the national newspaper claiming to be the most successful pollster in the country, 
without any significant objection from the public.  The public does not easily recall the
failures of pollsters in local leader elections because, on average, there is a local leader
election every two days.
Second, although polling in local leader elections is not profitable compared to poll-
ing in national elections, judging from their enormous number the former appear to 
provide enough financial resources for pollsters to survive and continue their operations.
Not only have pollsters gained significant financial profit, but many rely solely on Pilkada
for their wealth and fame.  For some pollsters, local elections provide the only opportu-
nity for financial benefit, as they cannot compete in national polling.  Most important, the
wave of local leader elections is attractive because it is truly a huge market.  To make a
simple calculation, in the first wave of Pilkada, for instance, in one round of local leader 
elections for governors, bupati, and mayors, there were approximately 510 elections with 
17) Interview with Andrinof Chaniago, chairman of the PERSEPI, Jakarta, September 1, 2009.
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more than 1,500 pairs of candidates.  Furthermore, the average number of pairs involved
in elections has increased in the ongoing second cycle that lasts until 2014.  According
to Juklak 2/2009, for instance, the Golkar Party requires three surveys for every local
election, which means the party conducts at least 1,530 political surveys.  Moreover, the
PD and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) require at least one
survey during the nomination process.  Meanwhile, the PDIP is beginning to consistently 
utilize polling for candidates to support the party’s decision to nominate local leader
candidates.  If we include polling conducted individually by candidates and businessmen,
the number is significantly larger.  Moreover, the potential market is not exclusively for
pre-election polls/surveys but also includes quick surveys, quick counts, quick real 
counts, exit polls, and political consultation.18)  Most important, pollsters’ activities in 
local leader elections are quite simple and manageable, requiring no large surveyor net-
works and costs, and fitting within local areas, customs, and cultures.  Finally, several 
cases demonstrate that successful pollsters that predict the winning local candidates gain 
not just money but also access to power and/or projects in the local area.19)
Another factor influencing pollsters that are intensively involved in local leader 
elections is that supportive funding from foreign donors has mostly ended.  Previously,
between the 1990s and 2005, certain pollsters received operational funding from external
donors to support their daily activities under the banner of developing democracy in
Indonesia; for example, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) supported 
the LSI from 2003 to 2005.20)  In 2004, almost all institutions, including the National
Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and LP3ES, saw the end of 
financial support from foreign donors.  This development required pollsters to search for 
alternative funding to run their programs.  The wave of local leader elections since 2005
has provided a significant alternative funding opportunity for pollsters.
To conclude, the huge market, the simplicity of managing local polling, and the end 
of some foreign donors’ support in 2005, as well as the invitation from political parties to 
18) The average costs for political consultation are as follows: (1) bupati or mayor: IDR 1 billion to IDR 
5 billion; (2) governor: IDR 3 billion to IDR 15 billion depending on the size of the population and 
the degree of candidate popularity.  The costs for surveys are: governor (three surveys) approxi-
mately IDR 1 billion; district leader and mayor (three surveys) IDR 300 million to IDR 500 million. 
Interview with Umar Bakry, secretary general of the AROPI and also head of the National Survey 
Institute, Jakarta, June 4, 2010.
19) Some pollsters, particularly those who provide political consultancy services, also request in addi-
tion to consulting fees a project agreement on behalf of “the sustainability of cooperation” to aid 
candidates in the running of their administrations.  In some cases, such pollsters request a “success 
fee” from their client.  Interview with Rully Azwar, Jakarta, June 15, 2010.
20) JICA provided financial assistance to the LSI amounting to IDR 3 billion from 2003 to 2005.  Inter-
view with Irman Suhirman, former operational director of the LSI, Jakarta, August 31, 2009.
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engage in political and strategic adaptation, as we will discuss next, has led national and
local pollsters to engage in the dynamics of local leader elections.
Instrument of Local Political Games
This section highlights the importance of the ongoing use of polling with regard to local
political games.  Polling is increasingly being used by political parties and other local 
political players in Pilkada.  Political parties have started to utilize polling in the process 
of identifying candidates.  However, at the same time, local political players such as
candidates and local elites have also started to take advantage of polling as a tool for 
obtaining a political vehicle, a bribery map, and a voter mobilization map, and as a means
for inviting the indirect bandwagon effect.
A Tool of Political Parties: Evolving Polls-based Candidacy
Responding to the change from indirect to direct local leader elections in the Indonesian
election system, political parties began to consider adjusting to polls-based candidacy for
winning those elections or at least minimizing failure and defeat.  Previously, the nomi-
nation process for local leader elections was based on both the iron law of oligarchy with
regard to local elites and the influence of “money politics.”  Under this situation, a can-
didate was in a better position if he or she was part of the local political elite or possessed
capital by which to procure a political party as a kendaraan politik (literally, a “political 
vehicle”).  Accordingly, to obtain a political vehicle, candidates paid party elites for
approval, a phenomenon known as political dowry (mahar politik).  The latter is an amount 
of money that stands as a symbol of agreement between the party elite and the candidate
so that the party or parties nominate the political actor as the only candidate to run in the
election.  In some cases, the giving of political dowry also means that candidates pay all
the costs of both the election nomination process and the campaign.  During this time,
“money talks” politics, mixed with the influence of the elites’ and local bosses’ weight 
and approval, are not only the first element in the nomination process but to some extent 
are really the only game in town.
The period of Pilkada, which started in June 2005, has changed the local political 
landscape by emphasizing that politics is no longer centered merely on local elites. 
Instead, local direct elections provide greater room for the will of the people to be the
new political epicenter.  Unfortunately, most political parties were not ready to adjust to
this new environment.  Many parties, including major ones such as Golkar, held old views
in facing the new situation: they assumed the effective working of the political machine
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and patrimonialism.  Parties in general did not have any idea how to respond to the 
 modern political challenges until they suffered defeats in the early stages of new direct
local leader elections.  For instance, the champion of the 2004 general elections, the 
Golkar Party, was beaten in almost 70 percent of local leader elections up until December 
2005.21)
Responding to those embarrassing defeats in the early stages of the first cycle of 
Pilkada, the Golkar Party revised its implementation guidelines (Juklak) for short-listed 
candidates to take advantage of polling techniques.  Golkar declared in December 2005
that it would rely on polling as the primary method for identifying candidates in local
leader elections (Juklak 5/2005) and invited pollsters to assist the party in determining 
and selecting candidates.  Golkar determined that it would examine the public accept-
ability of a candidate through periodic polling because it wanted to nominate the most
popular and least disliked candidates.  In Golkar’s understanding, the use of polling in the 
determination of prospective candidates would seem to increase the party’s success rate
in local leader elections.
The Golkar way of polls-based candidacy created a domino effect, spurring other
political parties to also utilize polling as a new device in reforming the selection process
and improving strategies for winning local leader elections.  The PAN in 2006 decided,
based on the national meeting held that year, to utilize polling as part of its process for
identifying candidates.  The PD in 2007 also turned to a pollster for help with its candidate 
identification and nomination processes.  Finally, although it had unofficially and partially
utilized polling since 2006, the PDIP officially decided in 2010 to take advantage of polit-
ical polling as part of the party’s decision-making process.22)  Among the main reasons 
why parties utilize polling is the need to modernize the party, minimize money politics
in local candidate selection, and reduce potential conflicts among political actors.  Another 
reason is that political parties need to adapt to new situations in order to maintain their
relevance in society.
1. Golkar Party
Golkar is one of the parties that have consistently applied polling in the recruitment of 
prospective regional leaders.  The Golkar Party issued its Operational Guidelines Num-
ber 5 in 2005 and strengthened those guidelines in the most current version (Juklak
Number 2 in 2009) (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Golkar 2009a).  The new guidelines
21) Among the 212 local elections held in 2005, the Golkar Party won 58, shared in 15 winning national 
coalitions, and lost 139.  See Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Golkar (2009b).
22) In 2006, the PDIP began unofficially using polling as a type of second opinion to balance the pre-
rogatives of chairwomen.
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require that the National Assembly of Party Leaders (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP) 
select the most electable candidate based on polling outcome.  In particular, the new 
guidelines require polling to be undertaken at least three times during the candidacy
process.  The guidelines also clearly divide the work between the party and the pollsters. 
Pollsters have been given a strong and independent role in measuring the popularity,
acceptability, and electability of candidates, all important ingredients in the nomination
process.
In Table 1, it can be seen that the party incorporates polling throughout the candidate 
nomination process.  Among the 14 steps making up the candidacy process, almost half 
are handled by professional pollsters.
Since the Golkar Party decided to utilize polling, the party has hired at least three
independent pollsters and polls-based political consultants.  All polling activities were
undertaken by the Indonesian Survey Circle in 2005, the LSI in 2006, and Indo- Barometer 
in 2008.  Political consulting services were provided by the Indonesian Survey Circle and 
Indo-Barometer.  Meanwhile, from the beginning, the LSI consistently worked only on
polling.
The new system has, on the one hand, led to a significant degree of displeasure in
the Golkar’s local cadres, as it is seen as a re-centralization of the decision making of 
nominating candidates.  Seen in this way, the involvement of pollsters has strengthened
the domination of the DPP over the DPD in the candidacy process.  The new system
Table 1  Candidacy Process of the Golkar Party
Subject Actor
1 Identifying potential candidates Regional Assembly of Party Leaders (Dewan
Pimpinan Daerah, DPD)
2 First polling on D-day minus 12 months Pollsters
3 Preliminary nomination DPD
4 Strengthening electability Pollsters
5 Second polling on D-Day minus 8 months Pollsters
6 Strengthening electability Pollsters
7 Admission period DPD
8 Verification of candidates DPD
9 Nomination of candidates Pollsters
10 Final polling on D-day minus 4 months Pollsters
11 Stipulation of candidates DPD
12 Endorsement of candidates DPD
13 Pair’s endorsement by National Assembly of Party 
Leaders (DPP)
DPP
14 Winning pair (Golkar party machine, pollsters, and
political consultant)
DPP
Source: 2009 Operational Guidelines of Golkar Party ( Juklak2/DPP/Golkar/XII/2009) (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
Partai Golkar 2009a).
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indicates a centralization of political recruitment.  On the other hand, the new guidelines
have had a somewhat significant impact on the party’s success rate in local leader elec-
tions.  From January 2006, soon after the Golkar guidelines were implemented, until the
end of the year Golkar won more than 64 percent of the 75 elections it participated in.
After utilizing polling, the party’s achievements in gubernatorial elections were better
than they had been in 2005.  Golkar won 46.8 percent of elections at all levels of the first
wave of Pilkada.23)  Up until December 2008 Golkar had won 42.42 percent of all elections
held at the district and municipal levels and 25 percent of all elections held at the provin-
cial level.  It is also interesting to note that 72 percent of Golkar’s achievements after
2006 were made through coalitions with other parties.  This provides evidence that poll-
ing led Golkar to improve its winning strategy by increasing cooperation with other 
parties (coalition) to significantly achieve victory in the first cycle of Pilkada.
2. National Mandate Party
Since 2006, the National Mandate Party (PAN) has applied a new approach to invite 
prospective candidates.  Unlike the previous approach, where the party selected only the 
internal party’s cadres, following its 2006 national meeting the PAN opened the possibil-
ity for outsiders (non-internal party cadres) to apply for nomination in local leader elec-
tions under the flag of the party.  This decision challenged previous mechanisms, which
emphasized that only the original candidates were to be supported by the party, with no
room for outsiders.  Accordingly, the party incorporated elements of political polling as
a key part of the candidacy process.  The new approach in the candidacy process is as
outlined in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that polling is an essential factor in deciding which candidates the
party will support.  To gain the optimum outcome, the party also requires two other 
qualities of its candidates—namely, integrity and capacity—as part of its final decision.
Yet, “electability” is most important among the candidacy criteria.24)  Regarding this new 
approach, Viva Yoga Muladi, the former deputy secretary-general of the PAN, highlighted 
that the new system was designed mainly to foster party modernization and to make the
party more rational and inclusive.25)  Most important, implementing polls-based candidacy 
was intended to prevent the political tendency of using the party as merely a “rental”
political vehicle in elections.  Moreover, the inclusion of polling in the nomination phase
has allowed anybody, whether a party’s cadre or an outsider, to gain the support of the
23) Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Golkar (2009b).
24) Interview with Bima Arya Sugiarto, chairman of the Assembly of Party Leaders of the PAN, Jakarta,
June 11, 2010.
25) Interview with Viva Yoga Muladi, Jakarta, September 2, 2009.
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party based on his or her potential to win the election.
The role of polling was strengthened after Drajat Wibowo, the academic wing of the
party, and Aria Bima Sugiarto, the former executive director of the Jakarta-based pollster
Charta-Politica, achieved the top-ranking positions of the DPP in the present era of the
Hatta Rajasa administration.  These two men are the figures behind the emerging role 
of polling in the party.  To support the thorough modernization of PAN, party elites are
in the process of creating internal pollsters as a strategic instrument to be wielded in 
both local and general elections.
Regarding the employment of polling in the party’s candidacy process, one of the
main rationales was that until December 2005 the party was a notable loser in elections.
The party failed to succeed, or to be part of the winning coalition, in 86 percent of elec-
tions up to 2005.  After the implementation of the new procedure of Winning the Local
Leader and Vice Leader Elections, PAN started to employ polling to help its candidacy.
As a result, the party experienced a dramatic improvement in performance: it won indi-
Table 2  Candidacy Process of PAN
Subject Actors
1 Preparation
Putting together Pilkada teams 
(1 year before Pilkada)
1. National team for Pilkada
2. Regional team for Pilkada
3. District/City team for Pilkada
Regular meeting held by the National Assembly of Party 
Leaders (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP), Assembly of 
Provincial Party Leaders (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, 
DPW), and Regional Assembly of Party Leaders (Dewan
Pimpinan Daerah, DPD)
2 Candidates’ admission to the party Regional team and district/city team are in charge.
3 Verification of candidates Regional team is in charge of the gubernatorial election; 
district/city team is in charge of the district leader and 
mayoral elections.
Polling/Survey
1. Pollsters measure electability of 
candidates (6 months before the
election).  In every survey pollsters
may add a maximum of 3 other
 candidates for comparison.
2. Pollsters make a map of local political 
dynamics.
3. Pollsters report the overall result to 
the national team.
Internal and independent pollsters
4 Nomination of the top 5 candidates based 
on polling result
DPP
5 Selection and stipulation of the pair of 
candidates
Gubernatorial election: The decision is made by the DPW,
the DPD, and the national team for the Pilkada.
District leader and mayoral elections: The decision is 
made by the DPW, the DPD, and the regional and 
national teams for the Pilkada.
6 Endorsement of the pair of candidates DPP
Source: Compilation Decisions of the First National Meeting of the National Mandate Party, namely the
procedure of Winning the Local Leader and Vice Leader Elections Number 11 Year 2006, articles
12–24 (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Amanat Nasional 2006).
Agus Trihartono168
vidually, or as part of the winning coalition, in 32 percent of elections in 2006, 22 percent
in 2007, and 23 percent in 2008.26)  The contribution of the new procedure has been that
polling outcomes, for instance, have guided the party to take the principal position in 64
winning coalitions in 273 elections from 2006 to 2008.  In other words, the surveys have
assisted the party in seeking opportunities and developing coalitions with other parties
that carry electable candidates.
3. Democratic Party
Two years after the wave of local leader elections, the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat,
PD) issued an organization rule (Peraturan Organisasi) on February 9, 2007, that spe-
cifically regulated the implementation of the mechanism for choosing candidates for local
leader elections.  Under the new rule, the party decided to follow the path of polls-based
candidacy prior to elections.  Incorporating polling in a party’s decision-making process 
is seen as a realistic policy for the PD.  As a relative newcomer compared to other major 
political parties, the PD has only a few grassroots support groups and does not possess
many reliable and capable original cadres to boost its performance.  Therefore, polling
has become not only a device to ensure that the party supports the candidate with the 
greatest chance of winning, but also an instrument to seek potential political actors to be 
included in the party as part of local and national party development.  Polling results are
also designed to help the party make political alliances and coalitions at the local level
with the most appropriate party, even with a party that it generally opposes.27)  All these
measures ensure that the party plays a part in running the local government.28)
The PD decided to adopt the new mechanism of polling under the rationale of 
improving political performance.29)  The old system of selecting candidates for local leader
elections was allegedly vulnerable to the abusive politics of “buying a boat” (literally
membeli perahu, or “buying a political vehicle”); many such cases were internally 
detected.30)  Therefore, under the new regulation number 02/2007, the function of Team
9 (three people from the DPP, three from the DPD, and three from the DPC to verify 
which candidates will run for elections) has been improved by incorporating polling in 
26) Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Golkar (2009b).
27) It was rare for the PD to enter into a coalition with the PDIP; however, because of the polling results,
the two parties finally entered into a coalition for the local election in Tomohon, North Sulawesi,
involving the pair Linneke Syennie Watulangkong and Jimmy Wewengkang (Manado Pos, May 27,
2010).
28) Interview with Marzuki Alie, member of the board of trustees of the PD, Jakarta, June 17, 2010.  He
is now also a speaker of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.
29) Interview with Akhmad Mubarok, Jakarta, June 14, 2010.
30) Interview with Akhmad Mubarok, Jakarta, June 14, 2010.
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the process.  As seen in Table 3, independent polling has assisted Team 9 in identifying
potential candidates.  The results are submitted to the DPP to be examined and approved.
Until December 2005 the PD had won only one election—in Toraja District, South
Sulawesi—and shared in 8.2 percent of all coalitions of ruling parties in 2005.  However,
after the party implemented the polling mechanism in March 2007, its share increased
to 13.64 percent of the winning coalition in 2007 and 16.23 percent in 2008.  The winning
rate after the introduction of polling was almost double (15.6 percent) compared to the
rate in the first year of Pilkada in 2005 (8.02 percent).  Considering that the PD is a
novice in local political games, this achievement cannot be overlooked.  Moreover, the
party has been the backbone of two governors in politically strategic areas, namely, East
Java and the capital, Jakarta.31)  In short, the achievement suggests that polling is an effec-
tive compass for a party facing new dynamics in local elections.
4. Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
In May 2010 the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) officially decided to
include polling outcomes in the mechanism it used to select candidates, a decision that
has provided new opportunities for electable candidates to gain approval whether or not
they are proposed from the bottom.  The PDIP is beginning to include the public’s voice
in its centralized decision-making process,32) especially in nominations for local leader 
31) Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Golkar (2009b).
32) The centralism of the decision-making process means providing room for “special situations” that 
allow for the chairperson’s intervention.  Interview with Pramono Anung, senior politician of the 
PDIP, Jakarta, May 31, 2010.  He is now a vice speaker of the House of Representatives of the 
Republic of Indonesia.
Table 3  Candidacy Process of Democratic Party
Subject Actor
1 Formation of Team 9 Meeting of Democratic Party’s Regional Assembly of Party
Leaders (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, DPD) for gubernatorial
election
Meeting of Democratic Party’s Assembly of District Party
Leaders (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) for district/municipal
election
2 Candidate admission PD’s Team 9
3 Candidate verification PD’s Team 9
4 Polling Pollsters
5 Nomination of 3 pairs based on polling 
results
PD’s Team 9
6 Selection and endorsement of a pair of 
candidates
PD’s DPP
Source: Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrat [National Assembly of Party Leaders of the Democratic
Party] (2007).
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elections.  Currently, the decision-making process of the PDIP for determining candi-
dates to contest elections is centralized in the DPP.  Although proposals of candidates
could always come from below, from the Regional Assembly of Party Leaders (DPD), the 
final decision in determining candidates is taken at a meeting of the DPP.  The DPP might
accept the DPD’s proposal based on the decision taken at the special meeting of the 
assembly of local party leaders (Rapat Kerja Cabang Khusus, Rakercabsus).  However, 
in practice, the DPP can decide to choose candidates different from those recommended
by the Rakercabsus meeting.  The DPP has the prerogative to make final decisions.
Regarding the use of polling, it should be noted that determining candidacy through
polling mechanisms improves the system in that it reduces the contraction of the party
due to losses in elections.  Moreover, polling has brought a novel atmosphere into the
party’s decision-making process because it has, to some extent, balanced the prerogative
powers of the general chairperson, Megawati Sukarnoputri.33)
The party’s candidacy process is shown in Table 4.
For the PDIP, polling is as an essential factor in determining candidacy.  Although
the party’s final decisions on candidacy have relied totally on the prerogative of the DPP
so far, polling has enabled the PDIP to have more choices in making rational and objective 
decisions.  Polling is now inevitably utilized in the current political ambience, and the
PDIP has taken this as a party adjustment to handle direct elections.  Accordingly,  Ganjar
Pranowo, a senior PDIP politician, highlights the necessity of the party to consider poll-
ing: “The PDIP cannot ignore polling as it is inevitable in the current political dynamics.
In particular, if the party is not ready to face the new realities and does not make adequate
improvements and adjustments in political recruitment, polling firms can help it not only
Table 4  Candidacy Process of PDIP
Subject Actor
1 Sub-District Executive Board meeting Special meeting of the assembly of local party leaders 
(Rakercabsus)
2 Branch Executive Board meeting Assembly of local party leaders






Assembly of local party leaders
Pollsters
4 Province Executive Board meeting Regional Assembly of Party Leaders (DPD)
5 Candidate endorsement by the DPP meeting National Assembly of Party Leaders (DPP)
Source: Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [National Assembly of Party Leaders
of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle] (2010).
33) Interview with Heri Akhmadi, Jakarta, May 31, 2010.
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to be superior in political recruitment but also to pose a significant threat to its political
rivals.”34)
The aforementioned suggests that the electoral system directly affects how political 
parties have begun to change the political epicenter from the elites to the public.  The
institutionalization of political polling seems to have improved the processes within par-
ties, as the polling outcomes serve to guide the party’s decisions.  However, the evidence
also shows that the weight of public preference measured by polling is still used for the 
sake of winning elections, especially in the selection of prospective candidates and the
creation of a winning strategy.
In a similar vein, the following discussion would seem to indicate how political actors
also make use of polling in pragmatic ways.  They are more interested in exploiting the
polls as a political weapon for the sake of political victory rather than hearing the public’s
sentiments.
Device for Obtaining a Political Vehicle
In the party-candidate relationship in Pilkada, it is clear that getting funds is a primary
purpose behind the party’s choice of candidate (Buehler and Tan 2007, 41–69).  Specifi-
cally, mahar politik works as the first element in the nomination process.  However, direct 
elections have raised the hope that through Pilkada the conservative nomination process 
will fade away to some extent.  As major parties began applying polling as part of their
political recruitment process, the desire to push the candidate closer to public prefer-
ences was obvious.  The closer the candidate was to the public’s approval, the greater 
the opportunity to be the winner—this is the new idiom in Indonesian local direct elec-
tions.
Polling results have become one of the candidate’s important instruments in dealing 
with political parties.35)  Parties are more welcoming of candidates who are likely to win,
and they are willing to offer them a political vehicle.  This was illustrated in the 2010
mayoral election of Sibolga city, North Sumatra, where one of the candidates used polling 
results to solicit the support of political parties and was able to obtain a political vehicle;
he received the majority support of 18 political parties without having to spend a signifi-
cant sum of money.36)  Sarfi Hutauruk was formerly a Golkar Party cadre and was involved 
34) Interview with Ganjar Pranowo, senior politician of the PDIP, Jakarta, December 23, 2011.
35) Interview with Rully Azwar, Jakarta, June 3, 2010.
36) The candidate received support from 18 political parties.  Hutauruk stated, “How should I pay 18 
parties?  What a lot of money I need to buy 18 political parties!  The truth was I came to these par-
ties one by one; I brought the hope to win because I convinced the parties’ bosses with polling 
results.”  Interview with Sarfi Hutauruk, the elected mayor of Sibolga city, February 15, 2010.
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in the party’s nomination process, a prerequisite for being a Golkar candidate for the
mayoral election of Sibolga city.  However, in the selection process Hutauruk was not 
nominated as a Golkar candidate as the party’s polling results indicated that his elect-
ability was lagging behind that of his rival, Afifi Lubis.  Consequently, the party nominated 
Afifi Lubis as its candidate in the mayoral election.
His failure to garner the Golkar Party nomination led Hutauruk to consider the sup-
port of other parties.  Before applying for other parties’ nominations, he hired a Medan-
based local pollster for the purpose of testing the waters and measuring his electability. 
He found that in four months, based on two polls, his electability rate increased and
approached Afifi Lubis’s.  In the last poll, three months before the KPU registration 
deadline, the results showed that Hutauruk’s electability was higher than Afifi Lubis’s:
43 percent versus 41 percent.  Armed with this electability rate, Hutauruk applied to
several political parties in Sibolga to get a political vehicle; he did not apply to the Golkar
Party, which was being used by Afifi Lubis.  Utilizing the polling “card,” he convinced
political party leaders to back him in his run for mayor.  He not only got the support of 
18 political parties but won the Pilkada held on May 12, 2010, in one round.  Hutauruk 
gained 45 percent of the votes; Afifi Lubis won 40 percent.
Another substantial change following the implementation of polling has been the 
minimization of party pressure on candidates.  It has traditionally been common for
political parties to view candidates who are seeking a political vehicle as an ATM.37)
However, when polls show that a certain candidate is a likely winner, that reduces the
tendency of political parties to charge the candidate large sums of money—or to treat
the candidate as an ATM—to get a political vehicle and political support.  The cost 
becomes negotiable and flexible, depending on the candidate’s electability.  Although the 
so-called mahar politik is not completely absent, as it still functions as a lubricant in the 
nomination process, the change is in the amount and the time frame.  Thus, for candidates 
who have an excellent chance of winning as indicated by polling results, money is still a
concern but is not first on the agenda.38)  The amount of pressure political parties place 
37) Interview with anonymous district leader, February 21, 2011.  He further said: “We cannot say there 
was no money in the nomination.  There was.  However, the candidate who had the highest chance 
of victory would be treated well.  In each nomination there was a registration fee as a normal pro-
cedure, a somewhat inevitable situation.  We have to pay all costs for the campaign and other 
‘operations’ needed in the area of contestation.  The amount comes mainly from the candidates. 
Nevertheless, once the parties began treating us as merely an ATM [automated teller machine], 
we would look for another party or run through the independent path.”
38) Buying the boat still remains a practice in Pilkada.  However, due to polling the party already has 
an idea of whom to support.  Thus, the foremost question is “Who will win?”  Next is the question 
of “How much?”  Interview with anonymous, February 14, 2011.
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on candidates decreases in line with the candidates’ possibility of winning.  The local 
branch leader of a leading political party in a district of South Sulawesi Province noted
that for the “convincing candidate,” the amount of mahar was no more than roughly the
amount needed for campaign logistics.39)  On the other hand, in the case of the PD, for
example, more than 75 percent of the money paid by the approved candidate was returned 
to be used for campaign logistics.40)  Furthermore, a candidate who is the most likely to 
win actually has better bargaining power in terms of choosing a political vehicle.  Such a
candidate has the opportunity to obtain the approval of a party without spending too much
“lubricant.”41)  A successful local leader in Sulawesi, for instance, suggested that the 
position of a prospective candidate was robust in dealing with local political parties.42)  A 
prospective leader does not only avoid being exploited as an ATM; to some extent, he or
she may have the opportunity to select a party or parties as a political vehicle, not vice
versa.
Nonetheless, as factors such as popularity, acceptability, and electability become 
vital in the nomination process, many candidates conduct their own polls and some 
manipulate the results.  Since polling outcomes can help boost the relationship between
candidates and political parties, some candidates request polling merely to gain a political 
vehicle.  A fraction of candidates hire a credible pollster to truly test the waters.  Other
candidates, to obtain the leading percentage of polling results, commission pre- nomination 
“tricky polls” to place themselves in an advantageous position.43)  In this sense, these 
candidates do not overtly manipulate the results of the polling but they do set its param-
eters to, for example, limit the number of candidates and select the names included in
the list so as not to endanger themselves in the final results.44)  Simply put, to obtain an 
advantage from polling results, certain candidates pay unreliable pollsters, reduce the
number of candidates tested, and exclude potential rivals from the polls.45)  Through 
various means, candidates create polls to suit their purposes and use the results of such 
polls as a valuable bargaining tool to obtain a political vehicle in local leader elections.
39) Interview with anonymous district leader, February 20, 2011.
40) Interview with Akhmad Mubarok, Jakarta, June 14, 2010.
41) Interview with Rully Azwar, Jakarta, June 3, 2010.
42) Interview with anonymous district leader, February 20, 2011.
43) Interview with anonymous local pollster owner, August 18, 2009.
44) Interview with anonymous local pollster head, September 18, 2011.
45) Because the survey results in the nomination are so valuable, certain local surveyors are intimidated 
by candidates or their supporters to favor certain candidates.  Initially, intimidation is carried out 
by bribery; and if that is not successful then the candidate resorts to preman (thugs).  Interview 
with Dedy Setyawan and Mohammad Muchlisin, field enumerators of the LSI, East Java area, Jem-
ber, August 19, 2010.
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Bribery Map
Local leader elections are sometimes marked by bribes to influence voters or community
leaders to give support to and vote for certain candidates.  Such bribery, commonly known
as serangan fajar (literary “sunshine attack”), refers to money or goods that are usually 
distributed among voters early in the morning of the day of local leader elections.
One surprising use of polling is to create a map to plan for a sunshine attack.  Polit-
ical polling is normally considered to be an instrument for calculating a candidate’s level
of support and for gauging a community’s desires.  Nevertheless, with a simple one-step 
modification, polling can provide information to a candidate regarding the potential for
vote buying and the particular areas in which such expenditures are necessary or useful.46)
In special circumstances, polling identifies the area to target and the amount of money
needed, as well as the way in which best to distribute the money.47)  This method also
identifies other factors that could sway votes and determines whether money affects 
voters’ choices.  Simply put, the survey creates a map that describes areas that can be
“bought” and areas that should be “neglected.”48)
Some candidates have become aware of the ability of polling to provide information 
useful for creating a bribery map.  Although not all pollsters, particularly not academic 
and idealistic pollsters, agree to conduct surveys that include questions to identify a 
sunshine attack area, there are other pollsters that, without a doubt, offer to supply 
candidates with information relevant to such money politics.49)  With a bribery map, 
candidates are able to identify how they can win the election not by gaining an absolute
majority but by obtaining a mere simple majority.  The map makes preparing a sunshine
46) Interview with anonymous national pollster head, August 17, 2010.
47) Not all polling is conducted to garner such specific information regarding vote buying.  However,
in situations of extremely tough competition (for instance, in the second round of the election),
especially in areas identified as contested and crucial, polling is used to create a strategy for vote
buying, based on the requests of candidates and their success team.  Such polling is intensive but
utilizes limited questions, around 4 to 10.  The questions are about vote-buying methods: in what
way, how much on average, and when it is most appropriate to apply.  The results of the polls are
essential to assist in vote buying.  For example, this type of poll was undertaken in only two areas
in Madura Island and some parts of Eastern Surabaya.  Those areas were considered highly crucial
in winning very tight competitions in the elections in East Java Province.  Interview with a pollster
leader, June 15, 2010; this information was confirmed by a regional party leader of the East Java
Province executive board of a leading political party.  Interview with anonymous party leader of 
East Java Province, February 24, 2011.
48) In the long and exhausting East Java gubernatorial election of 2009, a senior researcher at a leading
pollster told the author that a certain candidate and his success team had requested his pollster for
a polls-based political bribery map to “buy” the critical area in Madura Island with a sunshine attack.
Interview with anonymous, Jakarta, August 12, 2010.
49) Interview with anonymous provincial political party leader, February 24, 2011.
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attack more efficient, because the amount that needs to be paid can be accurately calcu-
lated and its disbursement can be well organized, so that candidates can then “buy” only
areas that are required to be bought.
According to a successful local leader candidate in East Java, a well-known pollster 
in the region has helped candidates understand in which area a sum of money should be
distributed, how much on average, and by which means.50)  A bupati (district leader) in 
South Sulawesi was tremendously impressed with the capacity of polling to generate 
recommendations for the effective use and efficient distribution of capital, thereby allow-
ing money to be spent on the correct targets.  The bupati even stated that polling had 
guided the delivery of bribes to precise targets.  Assisted by polling results, a vice bupati
was surprised to find that in his district there were certain areas where only the “Sarung
and Mukena” (praying outfit), not money, was an effective buy-off for a sunshine attack.51)
In addition, a party leader in East Java noted that polling provided a comprehensive map
for both a “sunshine attack and an anti-sunshine attack.”  The polling indicated which 
areas were controlled by a candidate or party and were their occupied “territory.”  Using
information provided by the map, political parties could decide which areas needed to be
“guarded” and which needed to be “attacked.”  Accordingly, the candidates’ success team 
deployed militant followers to keep their “territory” safe from the possibility of a sunshine 
attack by other candidates.52)  In short, the creation of a polls-based bribery map can help 
a candidate to implement “modern” vote buying.
Voter Mobilization Map
Since the implementation of direct elections, there have been high expectations that
voters with complete “autonomy” would determine the candidate most worthy of elec-
tion.  In fact, the current system of direct election still leaves room for the application of 
voter mobilization in some other ways.  Voter mobilization is usually conducted by polit-
ical actors utilizing parties’ militant followers, mass organizations, and even preman
(thugs) to ensure that voters come to the polling station to vote.  Voter mobilization is
done directly and indirectly.  Direct voter mobilization is when voters are visited and
persuaded to take part in a ballot for preferred candidates.  Indirect voter mobilization is
when attempts are made to influence voters’ point of view with information so that their
political decisions are in line with the interests of the political party concerned.
50) Interview with anonymous, August 17, 2010.  He further stated: “With the help of polling, I knew 
the vulnerable and the potential area for vote buying.  I managed to lead a sunshine war to attack 
and to make a counterattack in the election.”
51) Interview with anonymous vice bupati, February 17, 2011.
52) Interview with anonymous party leader of East Java Province, February 24, 2011.
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Until the end of 2005, elites’ guidance for voter mobilization came mostly from local
networks, political party assessment, elites’ intuition, and information from the grass-
roots.53)  However, along with the presence of polling in the Pilkada, political actors saw 
the opportunity to exploit polling to gain data for making an accurate map to guide voter
mobilization.  Some local politicians named this a “mobilization map.”  Besides figuring 
out the possibility and the factors for swinging votes in a community, an overall map
shows the areas that have been occupied, areas that are dominated by opponents, and 
areas that are still contested, as well as (most important) the extent of possible voter 
participation.54)  This polls-based voter mobilization map is used as a guide for carrying 
out mobilization.  It helps the candidate in protecting occupied areas and penetrating 
opponents’ areas.  In the area that the preferred candidate has an advantage according 
to the map, voters are encouraged to come to polling stations and vote for the candidate.
However, in areas controlled by opponents, the success team hires sukarelawan (volun-
teers)—and sometimes even utilizes local preman—to discourage and even intimidate
voters from going to the polling stations.  Discouragement is accomplished by de- 
legitimatizing the opponent with various political issues linked to a negative campaign.55)
Thus, the indicator of success in discouragement is that the fewer the voters who come
to the polling stations, the more successful the voter mobilization.56)
Besides the aforementioned ways of voter mobilization, information is spread in a
tactic known as serangan udara (air attack) through local mass media, banners, and pam-
phlets.  Candidates use the map for “push polling” in areas controlled by their opponents.
Push polling represents an underhanded attempt to use the credibility of polling to spread 
rumors repeatedly via SMS (short message service) blasts, telephone calls, and door-to-
door fake interviews.57)  Compared to the period before polling came to the fore, this map
does help political actors to identify the local political structure and voter dynamics.  In
53) Interview with anonymous provincial political party leader, February 24, 2011.
54) Interview with anonymous provincial political party leader, February 24, 2011.
55) The simplest approach is to discourage people from coming to the polling stations by spreading the
idea that it is both useless and a waste of time.
56) Interview with anonymous retired political consultant, Freiburg, Germany, June 17, 2011.  This was
in line with the statement by Denny JA, the owner of the Indonesian Survey Circle, that voter
mobilization was taken over by political consultants by door-to-door mobilization.  See the interview
with Denny JA by Najwa Shihab in Mata Najwa, episode titled “Solek Politik” (The primping poli-
tics), Metro TV, June 9, 2010.  For details, see Mata Najwa (2010).
57) Voter mobilization and push polls are employed one month, several months, or even six months
before local elections.  Candidates who have large sources of financial support, particularly in stra-
tegic and economically rich areas, engage in voter mobilization six months before the election.
Candidates even hire pollsters and experts to continuously or periodically monitor the ups and
downs of political support and the dynamics of voters in the area.
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short, polling results have provided political actors with valuable advice and information
for mapping voter mobilization in local contests.
Inviting Indirect Bandwagon Effect
One impact of the dissemination of political polling outcomes is the so-called bandwagon
effect.  In academic discussions there are two types of bandwagon effect: direct and 
indirect.  The former is a situation in which the polling outcome positively influences
voters’ tendencies to support the candidate who, according to the polling, has the great-
est chance of winning.  The indirect bandwagon effect is when a candidate who has an 
excellent chance of winning gains even greater support from third parties, usually such
elites as members of the mass media and businessmen.  Both effects increase the advan-
tage of the apparent future winner of the election (Young 1992, 20–21).  Simply put, the
first effect is support from voters in the form of electing the candidate in polling stations;
the second effect is support from the elites that comes in the form of mass media cover-
age, financial support, and political collaboration.
Because the publication of polling results in local leader elections is usually limited
and exclusively for candidates and inner circles, the indirect bandwagon effect is more
likely to occur than the direct.  For the former, the most likely subjects of bandwagoning
are businessmen and members of the local mass media.  Businessmen tend to get close
to power to maintain their business opportunities and to sustain their business careers
in a particular area.  Accordingly, businessmen usually endeavor to support candidates
in elections.  The mass media, on the other hand, give more attention and coverage to
possible winning candidates than to possible losers.
At least until the end of 2005, local elites, mass media, and businessmen provided
support to a candidate after the candidate convincingly proved backup from mass organi-
zations (Organisasi Massa, Ormas), had guarantees from the military, and had the back-
ing of a reliable political party machine.58)  At the time, businessmen and the mass media 
had difficulty knowing where support could be focused on.  Prior to polling, businessmen, 
media, and local elites had no clear picture of which potential candidate would succeed.
Therefore, taking sides with a particular candidate posed a dilemma.  To cover all bases,
businessmen, for instance, usually provided the same level of financial support to all
candidates.  The reasoning was that whoever won, they would be friendly with the busi-
nessmen.59)  However, this traditional tactic was expensive.  Businessmen who employed
this method were also alleged to be playing “a set of cards” that was unsafe as it was
58) Interview with Taufik Hidayat, senior politician of the Golkar Party, Jakarta.  See also Irman Yasin 
Limpo (2010, xii–xiii).
59) Interview with anonymous local businessman, February 12, 2011.
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associated with pragmatism and a lack of loyalty.  However, supporting only one candidate
carried a tremendous risk.
Polling in Pilkada has opened up new opportunities and has become a point of refer-
ence in garnering elites’ support.  Polling outcome is evolving as an effective medium to
guide the elites in providing support to certain candidates.  There are at least two ways
in which political actors use polling to solicit the indirect bandwagon effect in Pilkada. 
The first is that after the pre-election polling results are published, candidates or the 
success team actively deliver all beneficial information to businessmen and the mass
media by elaborating on the polling outcome and explaining the best-case scenario regard-
ing the potential winner.  By doing so, the candidates and their team invite the so-called
indirect bandwagon effect through which the candidates gain support and sponsorship
from businessmen, news coverage from the mass media, and political endorsement from 
political parties’ elites.
This method is actually in line with current trends, where businessmen are no
longer convinced simply by candidates’ old ways of showing support from mass organiza-
tions and political party machine networks.60)  Mass organizations and party networks are
less relevant in Pilkada, which rely mostly on individual voters.  The connection with
mass organizations is delicate, as such organizations cannot self-mobilize—they need a 
“locomotive” to work.  They are also expensive, as the “fuel” of mobilization depends 
primarily on the power of money.61)  Therefore, polling outcome is evolving into a new 
card for candidates to obtain backing, and it has been exploited to invite an indirect band-
wagon effect.  Although polling is not the only way to obtain support, the influence of 
polls’ outcome is inevitable and has always been part of the political persuasion.  In other
words, to obtain support from businessmen and mass media, candidates use their prob-
ability of winning the election, as shown by the polling outcome, to attract the indirect
bandwagon effect.62)  Thus, polling has changed the method by which businessmen take 
decisions on supporting political candidates.
The second way in which political actors use polling to attract the indirect band-
wagon effect is that support (services and even financial) can come also from pollsters.
Although this is not general pollster behavior, some pollsters have enthusiastically gone
on to become political advisers after their surveys correctly indicated a potential winner. 
60) Relying on backup from mass organizations and highlighting the magnitude of the political party 
machinery is no longer adequate to gain support from the elites: “They always ask me how the 
polling outcome is and how high I can go.”  Interview with anonymous mayor, February 21, 2011.
61) Interview with anonymous local businessman, February 14, 2011.
62) Interview with two national businessmen of the Indonesian Businessmen Association (Asosiasi 
Pengusaha Indonesia), Jakarta, August 28, 2009.
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In polling players’ vocabulary, providing backup to the candidate most likely to win is
known as bermain di atas gelombang (surfing on the wave).  Some pollsters are even keen 
to help fund a candidate who has the potential to win an election.63)  This is about more 
than fame; pollsters are more interested in the winning candidates’ investment in post-
election projects.  This trend has become a sort of business approach adopted by several
pollsters in local and general elections.  This is the other side of the workings of the 
indirect bandwagon effect in local leader elections.
Conclusion
Democratization at the local level has enabled political parties to use polling as a new 
instrument in local leader elections.  Although the importance of polling in the dynamics
of local politics, particularly in Pilkada, is quite new, polling has challenged the traditional 
approach toward party candidacy by pushing political parties to be more open to selecting 
popular and electable candidates.
A number of findings provide evidence of an unintended transformation in that poll-
ing has been used beyond capturing the voice of the people.  Although tracking the
people’s voice is generally a part of all polling activities, it seems that many political actors 
do not make maximum use of the polls to gauge the pulse of the public.  Instead, political 
actors in local elections have been more interested in the short-term exploitation of poll-
ing solely to win elections.
Not surprisingly, current politics at the local level appears to be more complex in
its internal configuration than is usually depicted.  It appears that we need to provide
more space for the discussion of polling in Indonesia’s local politics.  There is also room
for further discussion on the use of political polling in other developing democracies.
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